

were: *Appeal*, 1,824 daily and 3,800 weekly; *Avalanche*, 1,200 daily and 4,000 weekly; *Bulletin*, 1,200 daily and 2,500 weekly; *Argus*, 1,000 daily and 2,500 weekly.<sup>103</sup> Not only the citizens of Memphis and Shelby County, but also the residents of a hinterland including West Tennessee, Arkansas, and northern Mississippi, looked to the city's newspapers for information and guidance. The circulation area was expanding steadily, as transportation developments brought new areas into communication with Memphis. Northern Alabama, for example, became of interest to the city's newspapers after the opening of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad through that area in 1857. The attention given by the Memphis press to news items and correspondence from a wide territory illustrated its service to—and support from—the geographical area now known as the Mid-South. In journalism, as in trade and commerce, Memphis had taken its place as a regional capital.

103. The *Appeal*, the *Avalanche*, and the *Bulletin* each also had a tri-weekly edition of about 500 circulation. The figures for the *Appeal* are those of the proprietors, given in *Daily Appeal*, April 7, 1860, p. 2; those for the other newspapers are from United States Eighth Census, 1860, manuscript returns of Schedule 6, Social Statistics, for Shelby County, City of Memphis (originals in the Library of Duke University). The manuscript returns give the figures for the *Argus* as 2,500 daily and 1,000 weekly; since this seems to be an obvious transposition by the census taker, I have here used the smaller figure for the daily circulation and the larger for the weekly.

## FEDERAL OPERATIONS AT NEW MADRID AND ISLAND NUMBER TEN


LONNIE J. WHITE

By about mid-February, 1862, the Confederate line of defense in the West had, owing to the fall of Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, been broken near the center. This Federal penetration left the highly fortified Confederate stronghold of Columbus on the Mississippi isolated and outflanked, thus compelling its evacuation. Major-General P. G. T. Beauregard, second in command of the Western Department, selected Island Number Ten and vicinity, some fifty miles below, as the next best place to meet the Union advance down the Mississippi.<sup>1</sup>

A stronger natural position could scarcely have been chosen. Here the river made a horseshoe turn to the north. About seven miles further down it made a second U-shape turn back to the south. The east bank belonged to Kentucky and Tennessee, the west bank to Missouri. Island Number Ten, about one mile long and 450 yards wide, lay at the bottom of the first great bend. At the top of the second loop on the Missouri shore stood the village of New Madrid. Directly across the river lay Madrid Bend, the second of two peninsulas formed by the turns of the river. A few miles downstream was the little town of Tiptonville. A good road connected Tiptonville with the first bend. Behind the town and the road lay Reelfoot Lake. The river was high and swamps swollen by the overflow enclosed the entire Confederate position, making an enemy land assault from either above the bend or the east entirely unfeasible.<sup>2</sup>

1. Bruce Catton, "Glory Road Began in the West," *Civil War History*, VI (September, 1960), 232; J. Thomas Scharf, *History of the Confederate States Navy* (Albany, New York, 1894), 245; *Memphis Daily Appeal*, February 19, 1862; Preface of Pope's report to Joint Committee on Conduct of War, n.d., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 79. Hereafter cited *Official Records, Armies*.

2. Pope to Halleck, May 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 85; H. Allen Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters* (Baton Rouge, 1949), 71-72; Henry Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences of the Civil War in the United States* (New York, 1877), 99; John Fiske, *The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War* (New York, 1900), 101-103; Communication of correspondent, March 19, 1862, *St. Louis Daily Missouri Republican*, March 21, 1862.



Sketch of New Madrid and Island Number Ten

The responsibility for developing the defenses at and around Island Number Ten was on February 25, 1862, entrusted to Brigadier General John P. McCown. Forty-seven years old, a native Tennessean, and graduate of West Point, McCown had served on the frontier and in the Mexican War. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he had resigned his captaincy in the Union army to accept a commission in the Confederate artillery.<sup>3</sup>

Arriving at his post from Columbus on February 26, McCown found "no guns or works" on Island Number Ten and only two partially armed batteries of heavy artillery on the Tennessee shore. At New Madrid Colonel E. W. Gantt commanded two regiments of Arkansas infantry and two companies of artillery while Brigadier General M. Jeff Thompson was in charge of a small contingent of Missouri State Guards.<sup>4</sup>

Initial fears by McCown that he would not have time enough to prepare for an enemy assault were soon allayed by the prompt arrival of heavy guns and troops from Columbus above and Fort Pillow below. Within a few weeks seven batteries were ready for action, two on Island Number Ten and five nearby on the Tennessee shore. A floating battery containing nine guns lay moored on the north side of the island. The position was manned by nearly 7,500 troops. Anchored at New Madrid was a small fleet of gunboats under Commodore George N. Hollins, a native of Maryland and naval veteran of the War of 1812.<sup>5</sup> Though McCown seemed less certain, his superior, Major General Leonidas Polk, commander of the first division of the Western Department, was confident that the Federal gunboats upstream would find it impossible to run the batteries in the bend. Polk believed also

3. Mark M. Boatner, III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York, 1959), 529; Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903* (2 vols., Washington, 1903), I, 660. McCown was on March 10, 1862, promoted to major general.

4. McCown to Jordan, March 1, 1862, Thompson's report, March 28, 1862, Gantt to Polk, December 11, 1861, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 126, 172-175, 708-709.

5. Polk to McCown, February 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 760-761; McCown to Polk, February 27, 1862, February 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 760, 762-763; Abstract of Polk's memorandum of McCown's command, late February, 1862, *ibid.*, 186; Harris to Jordan, March 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 148; Winters to McCown, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 149-150; Polk to Gantt, February were Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi.

that Hollins' gunboats would, in the event New Madrid should fall, prevent any Union endeavor to cross the river.<sup>6</sup>

The task of breaking the Confederate grip around Island Number Ten was on February 18, 1862, assigned by Major General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Federal Armies in the Mississippi Valley, to Brigadier General John Pope. A native Kentuckian, forty years old, a West Point graduate, handsome, and "dashing," Pope had seen duty on the frontier and in the Mexican War. At the time of his appointment to command Federal operations against New Madrid and Island Number Ten, he was commander of the District of Central Missouri.<sup>7</sup>

Using Commerce, Missouri, as a base of operations, Pope promptly commenced, with troops sent to him from St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Cairo, organizing an army and making preparations for an advance against New Madrid, which Pope believed to be "the weak point of the system of defense on and around Island No. 10." If he could take New Madrid, he "would gain a point on the Mississippi River below the island which would at once intercept communications and cut off re-enforcements and supplies sent by water." The capture of Island Number Ten would, Pope reasoned, then be "a simple matter of time."<sup>8</sup>

By February 28, Pope had in his command approximately ten thousand men, and the first division of his army, commanded by Brigadier General Schuyler Hamilton, was en route via railroad to Sikeston, twenty miles north of New Madrid.<sup>9</sup> At about 2 P.M., March 1, Hamilton's advance guard, the seventh Illinois cavalry under Colonel William P. Kellogg, encountered near Sikeston a "reconnoitering force" of sixty-six mounted men under General M. Jeff Thompson. Badly outnumbered, Thompson ordered his men "to push for New Madrid . . . as fast as possible." For sixteen miles the two forces fought a running battle until Kellogg's cavalymen drew rein four

6. Polk to Davis, March 11, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. X, part II, 312; McCown to Polk, February 27, March 4, 5, 1862, *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 760, 765, 766.

7. Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary* 658-659; Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, I, 798; Jay Monaghan, *Civil War on the Western Border, 1854-1865* (Boston, 1955), 183, 186, 191, 194, 199, 200, 205-206; William T. Sherman, *Memoirs* (2 vols., Bloomington, 1957), 223. Pope was on March 21, 1862, promoted to major general of volunteers.

8. Preface to Pope's report to Joint Committee on Conduct of War, n.d., *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 79-80; Pope to Cullum, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 84-85.

9. Pope to Halleck, February 27, February 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 570, 572; General Orders No. 17, February 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 571-572; Washington *National Intelligencer*, March 10, 1862. Pope's army was subsequently designated Army of the Mississippi.

miles north of New Madrid. During the chase, Thompson lost three small cannon and several men captured.<sup>10</sup>

The remainder of the first division arrived before New Madrid on March 2. The same day Kellogg's cavalry and the forty-third Ohio regiment, commanded by Colonel J. L. Kirby Smith, "made a daring reconnaissance, penetrating . . . to within three-quarters of a mile of the enemy's intrenchments." At that point the Confederates opened with artillery and compelled the Federals to withdraw. The next day the entire first division, with the seventh cavalry "forming the advance guard and covering the flanks," moved upon the town only to be repulsed by "an unremitting fire" from McCown's artillery and Hollins' gunboats.<sup>11</sup>

In the meantime, the remainder of Pope's army had arrived at 1 P.M. and bivouacked about four miles outside town. Pope's total force now numbered about eighteen thousand.<sup>12</sup> Taking stock of the situation, Pope found the Confederate position at New Madrid to be quite formidable. Five infantry regiments and two artillery companies now comprised the garrison. About half a mile below the town stood Fort Thompson with fourteen heavy guns in battery. At the upper end of town was Fort Bankhead with seven guns. Between these forts the rebels had constructed "lines of intrenchments." Anchored along the shore were six gunboats, each mounting four or more guns. Though Pope believed he could "carry the intrenchments," he strongly doubted his ability to hold them without heavy artillery, which he did not possess, against "the destructive fire of the gunboats." Accordingly, Pope requested that heavy guns be sent to him as soon as possible.<sup>13</sup>

Hoping to blockade the river below from Confederate troop and supply vessels, Pope now sent Colonel J. B. Plummer with three thousand troops to Point Pleasant, some fifteen miles by land down

10. Jay Monaghan, *Swamp Fox of the Confederacy: The Life and Military Services of M. Jeff Thompson* (Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1956), 48-50; Pope to Halleck, March 1, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 580; Pope to Cullum, March 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 580-581; Thompson's report, March 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 173; *Daily Appeal*, March 4, 1862; *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 4, 1862. Believing resistance against such a large force to be futile, Thompson and his men subsequently disguised themselves as farmers and fled the town.

11. Hamilton to Williams, April 22, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 102; *Memphis Daily Avalanche*, March 9, 1862.

12. Cullum to Halleck, March 5, 1862, and Halleck to Sherman and Cullum, March 5, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 591.

13. Pope to Cullum, March 9, 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 81, 599; Pope to Halleck, March 3, 4, 1862, *ibid.*, 582, 588.



the river, to plant a battery of light artillery. Traveling "a circuitous route," so as not to be seen by the enemy, Plummer occupied the town on March 6. Although surprised by Plummer's force, two Confederate transports standing offshore managed to escape "without serious injury." At McCown's request, Hollins rushed the gunboats *Polk* and *Pontchartrain* to Point Pleasant to drive the Federals away. Although forced to withdraw by the ferocious fire of the gunboats, Plummer succeeded during the night in establishing batteries and rifle pits along the river banks. Next morning the gunboats continued the bombardment, but Federal sharpshooters, firing at the gunners from the rifle pits, kept the vessels at long range where they could do little damage. Too light to injure the gunboats, Plummer's artillery was not opened against them.

A few days later McCown planted two siege guns directly across the river. But according to Pope they made "no impression on the force at Point Pleasant." On March 11 Pope reported that transports could not, without gunboat protection, pass the Federal guns at Point Pleasant. Troops and supplies could, however, still be landed at Tiptonville a short distance downstream on the Tennessee shore and transported overland to the defenses at Island Number Ten.<sup>14</sup>

While waiting for heavy artillery to arrive from Cairo, Pope held the Confederate force defending New Madrid at bay. An assault on March 6 by the first division, now commanded by Brigadier General David S. Stanley, was broken up by a vigorous artillery barrage from the forts and gunboats.<sup>15</sup> Next day Pope sent the first brigade of the second division under Colonel W. H. Worthington to occupy a position behind the upper part of town. Worthington was to wait there until Stanley's division attacked the Confederates at the lower end and drew away the gunboats covering upper New Madrid. Then he was to "effect a lodgment" inside the enemy's trenches. But the Confederates were not deceived. Stanley's demonstration failed to draw the gunboats away and Worthington was forced to retreat.<sup>16</sup>

14. Pope to Cullum, March 6, 11, 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 81-82, 593, 604-605; McCown to Jordan, March 12, 31, 1862, *ibid.*, 127, 777; McCown to Polk, March 7, 1862, *ibid.*, 769; Plummer to Butler, March 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 114; Hollins to McCown, March 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 773; Pope to Halleck, March 5, 1862, *ibid.*, 591-592.

15. Pope to Cullum, March 6, 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 81, 593; Stanley to Butler, April 20, 1862, *ibid.*, 98; Robertson to Patterson, March 6, 1862, *ibid.*, 107.

16. Worthington to Russell, March 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 106.

On March 12 the heavy guns arrived from Cairo. Pope forthwith had them placed under cover of night in two batteries within eight hundred yards of Fort Thompson. At daylight Pope opened them against the rebel defenses, concentrating mainly on the gunboats. Land batteries and gunboats replied "briskly," and a lively duel continued until sundown. Though several gunboats were injured they were not driven away. Consequently, Pope asked that gunboats be sent to him to drive off those protecting New Madrid. If, however, he could not have gunboats, he must, he informed Halleck in St. Louis, have additional heavy artillery. It seemed clear to Pope that the enemy intended "to defend this place desperately."<sup>17</sup>

Actually, General McCown's determination to hold New Madrid had been weakening steadily. Soon after Pope's investment of New Madrid, McCown had written Polk in Jackson, Tennessee, that his position was "critical in the extreme." His only hope was that a large force would be "thrown here" to engage and defeat the Federal army in front of him.<sup>18</sup> But probably owing to the advance of Union forces up the Tennessee River in West Tennessee, no large body of reinforcements was forthcoming.<sup>19</sup> And proposals by Major General Earl Van Dorn, the commanding officer of the Trans Mississippi District, and General M. Jeff Thompson in Arkansas to strike Pope from behind came too late to save New Madrid.<sup>20</sup>

On March 13 McCown reported to Polk that Pope had not only been reinforced, but had also received heavy artillery against which "our gunboats are not sufficiently protected." Meeting in the evening aboard the flagship *McRae* with Brigadier General A. P. Stewart, in immediate command at New Madrid, and Commodore Hollins,

17. Pope to Cullum, March 9, 13, 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 82, 599, 609; Pope to Halleck, March 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 610, 612; Mower to Butler, March 15, 1862, *ibid.*, 96; Charles B. Boynton, *The History of the Navy during the Rebellion* (2 vols., New York, 1867), I, 534-535.

18. McCown to Polk, March 5, 7, 8, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 766, 771-772. See also Hollins to McCown, March 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 773. McCown subsequently asserted that his "principal object" in holding New Madrid "was to possess a landing for reinforcements . . . should I receive them." McCown to Jordan, March 31, 1862, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 751-752. Hereafter cited *Official Records, Navies*.

19. Robert S. Henry, *The Story of the Confederacy* (New York, 1931), 111-112.

20. Beauregard to McCown, March 22, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 797; Van Dorn to Johnston, March 18, 1862, *ibid.*, 790; Van Dorn to Beauregard, March 21, 1862, *ibid.*, 796; Beauregard to Van Dorn, March 19, 1862, *ibid.*, 791; Thompson to commandant of Island Number Ten, April 1, 3, 1862, *ibid.*, 806, 808; Thompson to Villepigue, April 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 806; *Daily Appeal*, March 27, 1862; Communication of correspondent, April 9, 1862, *London Times*, April 23, 1862.

McCown concluded that further resistance would mean "a constant loss of life" and serve only to delay the inevitable.<sup>21</sup> Consequently, he ordered the town to be evacuated that night under cover of darkness. All troops and property would be transported to Tiptonville. Stewart was to supervise the evacuation of Fort Thompson, Brigadier General L. M. Walker, Fort Bankhead. The gunboats *Polk* and *Livingston*, the steamer *Louisville*, and a large wharf boat were assigned to Stewart while the gunboat *Pontchartrain* and the steamers *De Soto*, *Winchester*, and *Ohio Belle* were to assist Walker. The rest of the fleet, except the gunboat *Grampus* and several small steamers, which were away at Island Number Ten, would drop down to Tiptonville.

No sooner had evacuation commenced than a "furious thunderstorm" broke "and the night became so dark that it was difficult to see, except by the flashes of lightning." The violent storm, mix-ups in orders, haste, and refusal of men to work, caused the evacuation to be accompanied by considerable confusion.<sup>22</sup>

Wading through "pools" of water "knee-deep," the second division of Pope's army, commanded by General Hamilton, moved during the early morning hours of March 14 to relieve the first division occupying the front. Quickly Hamilton's men took their places and prepared to attack the town at daybreak. As the day dawned, however, "a heavy fog shrouded everything from view." While waiting for the fog to lift, two men carrying a flag of truce approached the Union lines "with information that the enemy had evacuated the works." Pope, who had not expected McCown to abandon the town without a struggle, was both astounded and pleased by his adversary's action.<sup>23</sup>

An inspection of the works revealed to Pope that the evacuation had been "hasty and precipitate." Dead men "were found unburied"; suppers had been left "standing on the tables"; and candles still burned in tents. Among "the spoils," Pope found thirty-three pieces of artillery,

21. McCown to Polk, March 13, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 779; McCown to Jordan, March 31, 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 127, 785; Stewart to Jordan, April 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 162-163; Hollins to Polk, March 30, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 749-750.

22. McCown to Jordan, March 31, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 127; Stewart to Jordan, April 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 162-165; Walker to Jordan, April 9, 1862, *ibid.*, 169-170; Gantt to McCown, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 167-168; Hollins to Polk, March 30, 1862, *ibid.*, 184-185; Pope to Cullum, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 82.

23. Hamilton to Williams, April 22, 1862, *ibid.*, 103-104; Pope to Halleck, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 613; Perczel to Russell, April 19, 1862, *ibid.*, 108; Pope to Cullum, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 83.

several thousand stand of small arms, ammunition, provisions, tents "for an army of 10,000 men," horses, mules, wagons, and intrenching tools. A few men had in the confusion been left behind. Pope's success had been achieved at a cost of eight men killed, twenty-one wounded, and three captured.<sup>24</sup>

Though General Beauregard at the time approved McCown's decision to abandon New Madrid,<sup>25</sup> he later ordered an investigation presumably to determine precisely how great had been the need to evacuate and the manner in which evacuation had been carried out. From his analysis of the reports of the ranking officers at New Madrid, Major George W. Brent, the investigating officer, concluded (1) that New Madrid could have been held longer, (2) that "disorder and confusion" had "prevailed" during the evacuation at Fort Thompson, (3) that notwithstanding its availability sufficient transportation had not been "furnished" and (4) that at least a portion of the artillery could have been carried away.<sup>26</sup> No disciplinary action, however, seems to have been taken against McCown or any of his officers.

After occupying New Madrid, Pope turned the captured Confederate guns around to cover the river.<sup>27</sup> Next he began establishing batteries along the Mississippi below New Madrid. The first battery he set up on the night of March 17 near Riddle's Point a few miles below Point Pleasant and almost opposite Tiptonville. Next morning Hollins' gunboats moved in close and began a "furious cannonade," but the attack was repulsed. One gunboat was sunk and several damaged by Union artillery and a number of gunners were hit by sharpshooters firing from rifle pits along both sides of the battery. The engagement showed that Hollins' poorly armored vessels could not stand up against

24. Pope to Halleck, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 613-614; Pope to Cullum, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 83; Gantt to McCown, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 168; Statement of organization and return of casualties, March 14, 1862, *ibid.*, 91-93; *Daily Appeal*, March 16, 1862; *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 23, 1862; *National Intelligencer*, March 15, 17, 1862; Communication of correspondent in Cincinnati *Commercial* reprinted in *New York Times*, March 15, 1862; Communication of correspondent, March 30, 1862, *ibid.*, April 6, 1862. Confederate losses have not been determined. The *Memphis Daily Appeal*, March 9, 1862, noticed 17 Confederate casualties, but McCown on a later date reported 2 killed and 9 wounded. McCown to Jordan, March 17, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 786.

25. See Jordan to Pickett, March 15, 1862, *ibid.*, 781-782.

26. Brent to Beauregard, April 15, 1865, *ibid.*, 138. The guns had, owing to a mix-up in orders, been spiked instead of removed. Pope encountered no difficulty in unspiking them.

27. Communication of correspondent, March 21, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 23, 1862; Pope to Cullum, March 14, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 83.



heavy guns. Hollins therefore withdrew his fleet to a point below Tiptonville. The establishment of the battery near Riddle's Point and its success against the gunboats permitted the accomplishment of Pope's objectives. Transports could no longer land supplies or reinforcements at Tiptonville and the only way of evacuation for the Confederate army was cut off. Swamps below Tiptonville and behind Madrid Bend and Island Number Ten prevented any mass exodus in those directions.<sup>28</sup>

In the meantime, a Union flotilla of ten mortar boats, eight gunboats, and several transports had on March 14 left Cairo to attack Island Number Ten.<sup>29</sup> Commanding this fleet was Commodore Andrew H. Foote, a fifty-six year old naval veteran of forty years service. A wound he had received in the foot at Fort Donelson had not yet healed.<sup>30</sup> Though pressed by General Halleck at the beginning of the campaign to proceed immediately to Island Number Ten, Foote had, due to the necessity of repairing those of his gunboats damaged at Forts Henry and Donelson, refused to do so. The repairs had been made by March 12, but Foote had then waited until Halleck made arrangements for troops to accompany his expedition. Foote believed he would, in case he should reduce the rebel position with gunboats, need soldiers to hold it.<sup>31</sup>

Downstream at Columbus Foote picked up some two thousand men commanded by Colonel N. B. Buford. On March 15, as the flotilla reached a point about six miles above the island, the rebel gunboat *Grampus* suddenly dashed "out from the shelter . . . on the Kentucky shore" blowing her whistle to warn the Confederates below of the

28. Pope to Halleck, March 2, March 17, 18, *ibid.*, 85-86; 620, 623; Pope to Palmer, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 620; Pope to Foote, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 644; Walker to Pickett, March 20, 1862, *ibid.*, 794; Hollins to Beauregard, March 15, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 738; Communication of correspondent, March 21, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 22, 1862.

29. Foote to Welles, March 26, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 699; Communication of correspondent, March 15, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 17, 1862; Communication of correspondent, March 19, 1862, *ibid.*, March 21, 1862. The gunboat *Louisville* returned to Cairo soon after departure due to a leaky boiler. Six additional mortar boats subsequently joined Foote above Island Number Ten.

30. Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, 287.

31. Foote to Chief of Ordnance Bureau, March 5, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 657; Foote to Cullum, March 8, 1862, *ibid.*, 662; Foote to Halleck, March 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 688-689; Halleck to Strong, March 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 686; Cullum to Halleck, March 8, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 596; Halleck to Cullum, March 4, 7, 10, 1862, *ibid.*, 588, 595, 602; Foote to Wise or Fox, March 12, 1862, *ibid.*, 606-607; Halleck to Foote, March 12, 1862, *ibid.*, 608; Communication of correspondent, March 13, 1862, *New York Times*, March 17, 1862.

enemy's approach. Four shots thrown from the Union flagship *Benton* fell harmlessly in the water behind the fleeing vessel.<sup>32</sup>

About four miles above the island, just outside range of the enemy's batteries, the expedition halted. The Confederate stronghold was at this point plainly visible to the Union flotilla.<sup>33</sup> Since the beginning of the campaign it had been strengthened considerably. Five batteries, mounting about twenty-four big guns, spaced some four hundred yards to one mile apart lay along the Tennessee shore. A square redoubt containing two guns stood to the rear of Battery Number Four. Another five batteries containing approximately seventeen guns had been established on the island. Counting the nine guns of the floating battery, some fifty-two guns now commanded the river.<sup>34</sup>

Owing to "rain and fog," Foote was, except for two mortar boats, unable on March 15 to get his flotilla into position for bombardment. The current above the bend was extremely strong and if anchored by stern so as to bring the bow guns to bear, the gunboats would drift downstream under the enemy's batteries. The only solution, Foote concluded, was to tie up to shore "and help the mortar boats." On the 16th Foote placed his mortar boats and two of his gunboats in position and shelled at long range the entire Confederate position in the bend. The batteries did not, probably on account of the distance, return the fire.<sup>35</sup>

Lashing the *Benton* between the gunboats *Cincinnati* and *St. Louis*, Foote moved the vessels on the morning of March 17 to within two thousand yards of the uppermost rebel battery. There, in a determined effort to knock out the battery, Foote unleashed a terrific bombardment.

32. Communication of correspondent, March 15, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 17, 1862; Buford to Halleck, March 17, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 115; Trudeau's report, March 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 153.

33. Henry Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX (January, 1885), 439.

34. Sheliha to Davidson, April 3, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 810; Kennedy to Polk, July 4, 1862, *ibid.*, 178-179; Gray's report, March 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 138-140; Sketch of Island Number Ten, *ibid.*, 767. Sources giving the number of guns at this point vary slightly. A *crémaillère* line extending from the river to Black Bayou to guard against an enemy land attack from the north seems, in retrospect, to have been unnecessary since the country above was overflowed.

35. Foote to Halleck, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 620-621; Trudeau's report, March 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 153. McCown to Polk, March 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 784; Foote to Halleck, March 13, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 688-689. Communication of correspondent, March 16, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 18, 1862; Communication of correspondent in *Chicago Post* reprinted in *New York Times*, March 23, 1862; Boynton, *History of the Navy during the Rebellion*, I, 535-537. The mortar boats were commanded by Captain Henry E. Maynadier of Army Ordnance.

On the signal of Brigadier General James Trudeau, McCown's chief of artillery, heavy guns along the shore and on the island joined those of the upper battery in an attempt to repel the attack. During the fierce engagement the *Benton* was struck five times, the *Cincinnati* once, and a rifled gun burst on the *St. Louis*, killing and wounding fifteen men. Although the gunners at the upper battery were sometimes driven from their posts and several guns were knocked out, Foote was unable to accomplish his objective and at 7 P.M. withdrew his vessels.<sup>36</sup> The strong Confederate resistance prompted Foote to advise Halleck that "this place is stronger and even better adapted for defense than Columbus ever was. Each fortification commands the one above it. We can count forty-nine guns in the different batteries, where there are probably double the number, with 10,000 troops."<sup>37</sup> Foote continued the bombardment the next day at long range though seemingly with less vigor and little effect.<sup>38</sup>

While Foote was pounding away at the rebel fortifications in the bend, Pope was at New Madrid wrestling with the problem of crossing his army, now some twenty-five thousand strong,<sup>39</sup> to the other side of the river. Halleck suggested that Pope build a road from New Madrid through the swamps to the Missouri shore above Island Number Ten. Here he could join forces with Foote's flotilla and "strike" the enemy in the bend "nearly straight across the peninsula."

36. Trudeau's report, March 29, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 154-155; Steedman to Hughes, March 28, 1862, *ibid.*, 174; Rucker to McCown, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 159-160; Beauregard to Cooper, April 1, 1862, *ibid.*, 125; Pennock to Wise, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 619; Strong to Halleck, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 619; *Daily Appeal*, March 21, 1862; Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences*, 102. Captain E. W. Rucker was in charge of the upper battery.

37. Foote to Halleck, March 17, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 694.

38. Foote to Welles, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 699. Communication of correspondent, March 19, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 21, 1862; *Memphis Daily Argus*, April 12, 1862; Pope to Halleck, March 23, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 635; Communication of correspondent, March 23, 1862, *New York Times*, March 28, 1862. A balloon reconnaissance on March 24 revealed that most of the shells were falling behind the batteries. *National Intelligencer*, March 24, 25, 26, 29, 1862. The inaccuracy was presumably due to the long range. According to James M. Hoppin, *Life of Andrew Hull Foote* (New York, 1874), 275, Foote declined to bring his vessels "to close encounter with the forts, and kept his boats in good trim, not exposing or weakening his fleet, because he learned that the rebels had a force of thirteen gun-boats, independent of the five below New Madrid, and the much-talked-of *Manassas* at Memphis. They might come up at any moment, and dispute the possession of the Mississippi above Island No. Ten, and he thought it best to be careful of his boats." Foote's apprehension seems, in retrospect, to have been entirely unwarranted.

39. See Strength and organization of Army of the Mississippi, March 31, 1862, *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 94.

But an examination of the country by Pope's chief engineer officer, Colonel J. W. Bissell, revealed the "whole region" to be under water and the building of a road to be entirely out of the question. Besides, Pope believed it would be the better course to land his army opposite New Madrid and attack the fortifications in the bend from the rear. To carry out this plan he would need some means of ferrying his troops across the river and protecting their landing against the enemy batteries which had recently been established in Madrid Bend. On March 17 Pope asked Commodore Foote to run the batteries at Island Number Ten with two or three gunboats. If Foote would do this, Pope wrote Brigadier General George W. Cullum at Cairo, "I can cross my whole force and capture every man of the enemy at Island No. 10 and on the main-land."<sup>40</sup>

Foote declined Pope's request, however, on grounds of "impracticability." The ill success thus far of his flotilla against the batteries in the bend caused him to believe such a feat as Pope desired to be impossible. On March 20 Foote queried his gunboat commanders on the matter and found all but Captain Henry Walke of the *Carondelet* to be in complete agreement with him.<sup>41</sup>

Thus thrown on his own resources, Pope instructed Colonel Bissell to examine the peninsula "to ascertain whether a short canal . . . cannot be dug, so that boats can enter above Island No. 10 and come out into the river below it." Bissell found two bayous, heading about five hundred yards apart, which he believed might be utilized in the construction of a canal. One bayou emptied into the Mississippi below Island Number Eight, the other two miles above New Madrid. Pope forthwith ordered Bissell's engineer regiment and Buford's troops with Foote's flotilla to begin work.<sup>42</sup>

Though "infinitely more difficult" to build than Pope had anticipated, the canal was completed by April 1. It was fifty feet wide, four

40. Halleck to Strong, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 618; Pope to Halleck, May 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 86; Pope to Cullum, March 17, 1862, *ibid.*, 619-620. Pope evidently expected to use the gunboats both to ferry his troops across the river and to cover his landing.

41. Pope to Halleck, May 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 86; Pope to Halleck, March 19, 1862, *ibid.*, 625; Pope to Bissell, March 19, 1862, *ibid.*, 625; Foote to Welles, March 20, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 197; Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX, 441.

42. Pope to Bissell, March 19, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 625-626; Halleck to Pope, March 21, 1862, *ibid.*, 629; Pope to Halleck, March 21, May 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 86, 630. John W. Burgess, *The Civil War and the Constitution, 1859-1865* (2 vols., New York, 1901), I, 315. The idea of a canal was General Hamilton's.

feet deep, and six miles long. Transports could be brought through with little difficulty, but much to Pope's disappointment Bissell had been unable to make the channel deep enough for gunboats.<sup>43</sup>

Pope determined, however, to proceed without gunboats. On April 2 he told Halleck that he would soon be ready to cross the river. Transports and barges had been brought safely through the canal. The barges were being used in the construction of a crude four-gun floating battery. As soon as the battery was completed Pope planned to anchor it under cover of night at the mouth of a slough about one and a half miles above Watson's Landing, where he proposed to disembark his troops. Covered by the floating battery and two land batteries on the Missouri shore, Pope would the following morning endeavor to make a landing. Once his army gained a foothold on the bank "no force the enemy has can dislodge it."<sup>44</sup>

Meanwhile, on the other side of the stream, General Beauregard had—probably due to loss of confidence in his subordinate and in the hope of bolstering troop morale—relieved McCown of command in favor of Brigadier General William W. Mackall. Forty-six years old, a native of Washington, D. C., and a graduate of West Point, Mackall had commanded troops on the frontier and in the Mexican War. At the time of his appointment to head the Confederate forces at Island Number Ten, he was an assistant adjutant general on the staff of General Albert Sidney Johnston, commander of the Western Department.<sup>45</sup> Arriving at his new post on March 31, Mackall found the troops "dispirited" by the evacuation of New Madrid and "broken down by hard labor." McCown advised him before leaving that Pope's attempt to cut a canal across the peninsula would fail and that Mackall's position was "safe" as long as the river was up presumably

43. Pope to Halleck, March 25, 27, 28, 31, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 643, 645, 646, 650; Communication of correspondent, March 21, 25, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, March 24, 27, 1862; Hoppin, *Andrew Hull Foote*, 278. For accounts of the building of the canal, see communication of correspondent in Cincinnati *Commercial* reprinted in *National Intelligencer*, April 15, 1862; letter of a soldier in *New York Times*, April 11, 1862; and Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (eds.), *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York, 1956), I, 460-462.

44. Pope to Halleck, April 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 655-657.

45. Special Orders No. 445, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 804; Boatner, *Civil War Dictionary*, 498-499; Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army*, I, 670; Joseph H. Parks, *General Leonidas Polk, C.S.A.; The Fighting Bishop* (Baton Rouge, 1962), 241-242.

to make unfeasible an enemy attack from either the east or above the first bend.<sup>46</sup>

Mackall promptly began "increasing" his "batteries and establishing order among the troops and system in the staff department." On April 3 he reported having seen Union transports "collected in large numbers" opposite Madrid Bend. If the Federals should cross, Mackall told Beauregard, "the game is practically up. It takes an army to defend the ground. One good regiment would be better than the force which I have. It never had any discipline. It is disheartened—apathetic."<sup>47</sup>

Commodore Foote had in the meantime called, on about March 29, a second consultation of his commanders aboard the *Benton* to consider a final appeal by Pope for one gunboat. Again all except Captain Walke of the *Carondelet* "concurred in the opinion . . . that the attempt to pass the batteries was too hazardous and ought not to be made." This time, however, Foote asked Walke if he would agree to running the gantlet alone. Receiving an affirmative reply, Foote formally instructed Walke to "avail yourself of the first fog or rainy night and drift your steamer down past the batteries of the Tennessee shore and Island No. 10 until you reach New Madrid." In the event of disaster, he was to destroy his vessel to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy. Foote's order for Walke to wait until "some foggy or rainy night" caused Pope to despair of obtaining Foote's assistance. "The moon is beginning to make the nights light," he grumbled, "and there is no prospect of fogs during this sort of weather." Pope therefore continued to proceed on the assumption that no gunboat would be forthcoming.<sup>48</sup>

While Walke waited for a suitable night to depart on his mission, Foote's flotilla cleared several obstacles from the *Carondelet's* path. On the evening of April 1 Colonel George W. Roberts with fifty sol-

46. Mackall to Cooper, August 21, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 132. Apparently McCown had come to believe that the Union gunboats could not successfully pass the batteries in the bend.

47. See Mackall to Jordan, April 3, 1862, *ibid.*, 808-809.

48. Pope to Foote, March 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 644; Two letters from Pope to Halleck, April 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 655-657; Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX, 441-442; Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences*, 117-118; Foote to Pope, April 6, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 714-715. Pope had on March 27 asked Halleck to direct Foote "to remove his crews from two" gunboats "and turn over the boats to me." Whether Foote knew about Pope's request at the time of the second council of war has not been determined. Pope to Halleck, March 27, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 645.



diers of the forty-second Illinois regiment left the flotilla in five barges and at 11 P.M. chased away two surprised guards at the upper Confederate battery on the Tennessee shore. Quickly spiking the guns, the expedition departed before the first Alabama regiment encamped nearby could stop them.<sup>49</sup> Two days later three gunboats and three mortar boats joined in a vigorous fire upon the floating battery, forcing it to drift two or three miles downstream.<sup>50</sup> On April 4 a shell struck the steamer *Winchester*, which the Confederates had sunk in the main channel to impede navigation, causing the vessel to burn.<sup>51</sup>

Notwithstanding prospects for clear weather, Walke secured on April 4 Foote's approval to try passing the batteries that night as soon as the moon went down. To make the *Carondelet* as invulnerable as possible, a barge was filled with coal and hay and lashed to the port side, where there was no iron plating. The upper deck was covered with lumber, chain cables, and other heavy materials. Cables and ropes were coiled around the pilot house, and heavy timber and iron were placed around the engine room. To prevent puffing the machinery was so adjusted as to permit the escape of steam through the wheel house rather than the steam pipes. Hot water hoses were connected to the boiler for use in drenching an enemy boarding party. Crewmen were armed and a small detachment of sharpshooters from Colonel Buford's command came aboard. Captain William R. Hoel, first master of the *Cincinnati*, with twenty-one years of experience on the Mississippi, was assigned the task of taking the *Carondelet* through the channel.

At sundown, "a set of black clouds, rapidly increasing in width, bordered the horizon from the north-west, strongly evidencing an approaching storm." At 10 P.M. the moon went down and the storm appeared to be ready "to burst." With all lights out, guns "run back," and "ports closed," the *Carondelet* weighed anchor and headed downstream guided only by the brilliant flashes of lightning. As the vessel passed Battery Number Two the soot in the smoke stacks suddenly caught fire and a blaze five feet high leaped into the sky "lighting

49. Communication of correspondent, April 7, 1862, *Daily Appeal*, April 11, 1862; Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences*, 106-107; Foote to Halleck, April 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 119-120; Scott to Stanton, April 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 124-125; Mackall to Jordan, April 3, 1862, *ibid.*, 809.

50. Foote to Halleck, April 3, 1862, *ibid.*, 120. The floating battery was commanded by Lieutenant S. W. Averett.

51. Trudeau's report, March 29, 1862, *ibid.*, 153; Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences*, 109.

brightly the upper deck and everything around." The flue caps were closed and the flames subsided. Although Confederate sentinels apparently failed to observe this flare-up, they did not miss a second following close on the heels of the first. Rifle fire and rockets quickly gave the alarm and heavy artillery was promptly brought into action.

Hugging the eastern shore, the *Carondelet* passed nearly under the guns along the bank. Either because they overestimated the distance or could not depress their guns sufficiently, the Confederates on both shore and island lobbed shells for thirty minutes from five to thirty yards over the passing vessel. Finally, the floating battery, tied to the Tennessee side about three miles below Island Number Ten, remained as the last major obstacle. But moving over toward the Missouri mainland, the *Carondelet* was past and almost out of range before the floating battery opened fire. One shot struck the barge and another fell into a bale of hay; four or six others fell innocuously into the water.

Near New Madrid Walke feared that General Pope might mistake him for the enemy. But fortunately Walke and Foote had agreed that in case of success Walke should fire his guns in a certain pattern as he rounded Madrid Bend. Foote was to fire a similar pattern in acknowledgment. Pope heard and understood this signal "though a misapprehension had induced him to look for three" red, white, and blue lights. At 1 A.M., April 5, the *Carondelet* was secured to the landing at New Madrid.<sup>52</sup>

No sooner had the gunboat docked than Pope asked Foote to send him another. The "lives of thousands of men and the success of our operations hang upon your decision," Pope told the commodore. "With the two boats all is safe; with one, it is uncertain." According to Pope, there was little danger in running the batteries in the bend. The *Carondelet* had run the gantlet without difficulty. And Confederate gunboats, though smaller and more vulnerable than Federal gunboats, "pass and repass our batteries in the night without injury."

52. *Ibid.*, 124-134; Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX, 442-443; Pope to Foote, April 5, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 660; Foote to Pope, April 4, 1862, *ibid.*, 122-123; Foote to Welles, April 6, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 712-713; Communication of correspondent, April 5, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 7, 1862; *ibid.*, April 8, 1862; Communication of correspondent, April 7, 1862, *Daily Appeal*, April 11, 1862; *ibid.*, April 8, 1862; Phillips Melville, "The *Carondelet* Runs the Gantlet," *American Heritage*, X (October, 1959), 66-72; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 70-82.

Besides, heavy guns could not at night fire with accuracy at a moving object.<sup>53</sup>

With some misgivings Foote ordered the *Pittsburgh*, commanded by Lieutenant Commander Egbert Thompson, to join the *Carondelet*. Leaving the flotilla at 2 A.M., April 7, during a violent thunderstorm, the *Pittsburgh* was quickly discovered by alert rebel sentinels and subjected to a terrific cannonading. But the vessel passed untouched and at 5 A.M. arrived at New Madrid.<sup>54</sup>

Meantime, Pope had on April 6 sent the *Carondelet* downstream to ascertain the number and location of the enemy batteries along the opposite shore. About six batteries were discovered some "1 and 2 miles" apart between Watson's and Meriwether's landings. To "satisfy" Pope of the *Carondelet's* "ability to capture them," Walke laid down a heavy barrage to drive the gunners away from the battery opposite Point Pleasant and put ashore a small infantry force under Captain L. H. Marshall for the purpose of spiking the guns.<sup>55</sup>

By April 7 Pope was ready to cross the river. In the morning he sent the *Carondelet* and the *Pittsburgh* to engage and silence the "upper" Confederate batteries near where he proposed to land his troops. One by one the gunboats attacked and knocked the batteries out. During the morning's action, two shells struck the *Carondelet*, damaging slightly the steering apparatus.<sup>56</sup>

At about noon Captain Walke signaled Pope that the batteries had been silenced. Forthwith Pope ordered the fourth division, commanded by Brigadier General E. A. Paine, to begin crossing. Disembarking near Watson's Landing, Paine found the Confederates had withdrawn. Learning from a spy that the main body of Mackall's command "was in motion towards Tiptonville,"<sup>57</sup> Pope directed Paine not

53. Pope to Foote, April 5, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 660. See also Scott to Stanton, April 6, 1862, *ibid.*, 666.

54. Communication of correspondent, April 7, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862; Pope to Foote, April 7, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 719; Foote to Halleck, April 7, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 668; Melville, "The Carondelet Runs the Gantlet," *American Heritage*, X, 77.

55. Pope to Halleck, April 6, May 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 88, 667; Walke, *Naval Scenes and Reminiscences*, 143-145; Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX, 443; Communication of correspondent, April 7, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862.

56. *Ibid.*; *Daily Argus*, April 9, 1862.

57. Mackall subsequently stated that he had on April 6 suspected an effort would be made to land the next day and had called his troops to a "central point" in Madrid Bend where they would be in a position to meet an invasion in force. But before they

to wait for the other divisions but to push forward to Tiptonville as rapidly as possible. He also sent Walke "with the two gunboats to Tiptonville and the landing below" to guard against any attempt at escape via water.<sup>58</sup>

Three times during the retreat the Confederates formed to meet the Union army pressing upon their rear, but each time as the Federals drew near, the formation broke.<sup>59</sup> Mackall's intentions were to follow the "river road" through Tiptonville to a slough below whence he would follow the river bank southward. There is no evidence to indicate Mackall's ultimate objective, but one presumes that he hoped either to be met at some point on the bank by transports or to follow high ground to Reelfoot Lake where he would attempt a crossing on rafts to safety.<sup>60</sup>

Coming to where the road divided immediately above Tiptonville, Mackall took the fork running along the river in front of the town. Before reaching where the roads junctured again below the village he was compelled by the presence of the two Union gunboats to halt under cover of timber. While stopped, part of Paine's division got in Mackall's front while the rest came upon him from behind. Believing resistance to be useless, Mackall at 2 A.M., April 8, surrendered unconditionally his "entire force" to General Paine.<sup>61</sup>

While Mackall had been retreating toward Tiptonville, Lieutenant Colonel W. D. S. Cook of the twelfth Arkansas infantry and Captain A. Jackson of the Tennessee artillery, in command of Island Number Ten and the Tennessee shore respectively, had ordered the evacuation of their posts and left with their men to escape via Stone's ferry across Reelfoot Lake and on foot through the swamps beyond. Two lieutenants left behind in the confusion of evacuation promptly

"had assembled from the different posts in the wide circuit of the bend the enemy were landing . . . I now determined to save, if possible, my infantry and light artillery by a retreat." Mackall to Cooper, August 21, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 133.

58. Morgan to Walke, April 7, 1862, *ibid.*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 669; Pope to Halleck, May 2, 1862, *ibid.*, 89-90; Communication of correspondent, April 7, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862; *Daily Appeal*, April 12, 1862.

59. Paine to Butler, April 16, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 109.

60. Mackall to Cooper, August 21, November 26, 1862, *ibid.*, 132-133, 135. One strongly doubts the feasibility of either course.

61. Cumming to Paine, April 10, 1862, *ibid.*, 111-113; Paine to Butler, April 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 109-110.

surrendered Island Number Ten to Commodore Foote. And land forces under Colonel Buford quickly occupied the entire stronghold.<sup>62</sup>

Pope reported on the day of Mackall's surrender that he had captured 6,000 men. He later set the number at 6,976. A more accurate estimate would probably be about 5,000, the number given by General Paine, Captain Walke, and a Missouri newspaper correspondent.<sup>63</sup> The Confederate army at New Madrid and Island Number Ten, which was reported in late February to number nearly 7,500, had been reduced somewhat after the evacuation of New Madrid by the removal of several regiments. And probably 500 or more men escaped capture by crossing Reelfoot Lake (on rafts and Stone's Ferry) and wading through the swamps to the Memphis and Ohio Railroad.<sup>64</sup> In addition to most of the garrison, Pope captured over one hundred artillery pieces, several thousand stand of arms, a number of small steamers and wharf boats, ammunition, tents, provisions, livestock, and wagons.<sup>65</sup> According to one historian, the great loss in men and supplies at Island Number Ten, which were in short supply to the Confederate forces in the West, was one of the most important consequences of the Union victory.<sup>66</sup>

It would seem, in retrospect, that General Pope conducted a highly skilful and efficient campaign. He pressed vigorously the Confederate forces at New Madrid and would probably have, though perhaps at high cost in lives, succeeded in crossing the river and capturing Mackall's army without the help of gunboats. His success sub-

62. Foote to Halleck, April 8, 1862, *ibid.*, 674; Jackson to Jordan, April 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 157-159; Cook to Jordan, April 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 175-176; Foote to Welles, April 7, 8, 1862, *Official Records, Navies*, ser. I, vol. XXII, 720-721; *Daily Appeal*, April 9, 1862; Communication of correspondent, April 8, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862.

63. Pope to Halleck, April 8, May 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 89-90, 675; Paine to Butler, April 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 110; Walke, "Operations of the Western Flotilla," *Century Magazine*, XXIX, 443; Communication of correspondent, April 10, 1862, *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862; *Daily Appeal*, April 22, 1862.

64. Pickett to Polk, March 18, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 789; McCown's report, March 31, 1862, *ibid.*, 128-129; Jackson to Jordan, April 16, 1862, *ibid.*, 157-159; Cook to Jordan, April 13, 1862, *ibid.*, 175-176; *Daily Appeal*, April 11, 1862. See also a paper entitled "Strength and Organization of the Confederate forces at Madrid Bend and Island No. 10, April 7, 1862," in Donaldson Papers, West Tennessee Historical Society.

65. Pope to Halleck, April 8, May 2, 1862, *Official Records, Armies*, ser. I, vol. VIII, 89-90, 675; *Daily Missouri Republican*, April 11, 1862; *National Intelligencer*, April 9, 10, 15, 1862; *New York Times*, April 9, 1862. Pope did not lose a single man in the entire operation.

66. Stanley F. Horn, *The Army of Tennessee* (New York, 1941), 145.

sequently won him command of a major army in the East, where he would suffer shattering defeat at the hands of General Robert E. Lee.<sup>67</sup>

Any appraisal of Pope's performance on the Mississippi, however, probably should take into consideration the caliber of the opposing commanders. McCown and Mackall were at best no more than second or third rate generals. McCown showed a lack of resoluteness in evacuating New Madrid while the most that can be said of Mackall is that he assumed command too late to make any difference in the outcome of the operation. Both generals were, however, in attempting to deal with Pope's land actions, handicapped by a shortage of troops.

The capture of New Madrid and Island Number Ten consumed about one and a half months. Less time would undoubtedly have been required had General Pope received the full support of Commodore Foote. Foote was not only late in arriving at the scene of action, but he also refused to engage the batteries in the bend at close range. More exasperating to Pope was his reluctance to risk running the gauntlet. One may sympathize with Foote's concern for the safety of his vessels, but the purpose for which Pope needed them would seemingly have justified an earlier endeavor to run the batteries.

The fall of the Confederate stronghold at Island Number Ten and the failure at Shiloh, which came almost simultaneously, constituted a double blow to the declining fortunes of the Confederacy in the West. While the results at Shiloh assured the success of the Federal thrust through West Tennessee, the fall of Island Number Ten broke another link in the chain of Confederate defenses on the Mississippi. Fort Pillow now stood as the only major river fortification between the Union forces and Memphis.

67. Warren W. Hassler, Jr., *Commanders of the Army of the Potomac* (Baton Rouge, 1962), 56-76. Pope's defeat came in the Battle of Second Manassas, August 29-30, 1862.