

was not a replacement for an extensively organized political machine. However successful merchandising techniques may have been in the business arena, they clearly had a more circumscribed applicability to politics.

It remains uncertain how representative Saunders is of merchandisers in politics during the twenties. Any attempt to study the history of merchandising in politics is handicapped by the paucity of available materials. Few studies of politics or merchandising make reference to the early years of their collaboration. Surely a subject of such importance to contemporary society merits greater attention from scholars.

A RUSE THAT WORKED: THE CAPTURE OF UNION CITY IN 1864

LONNIE E. MANESS

As 1863 came to an end, the military situation was not good for the Confederacy. The Mississippi River was under Union control, the Confederacy was split in two, and both General Robert E. Lee in Virginia and General Joseph E. Johnston in Georgia were on the defensive. They were preparing for what they knew would be the inevitable advances of Grant and Sherman. The Northern forces had a new command system with Grant issuing the orders; however, the South's control of its forces was still divided into feudal departments.¹ It was not until early 1865 that the Confederacy had a similar system.

The military position of the North was very favorable, however, the political situation was none too good. The people of Kentucky were beginning to realize that Lincoln's promise of slaves and the Union had been only promises. Their slaves were gone, and the Union Kentuckians cherished was not the Union they had been fighting for. With Kentucky and other border states coming to this realization, the Democratic party had a new surge of life and with it went talk of George B. McClellan for President. The party of Lincoln referred to these people as Copperheads.²

It soon became evident that unless Grant and Sherman won some decisive victories, Lincoln would probably not be reelected in the fall campaign. His failure to be reelected would probably mean victory for the Confederacy. There was evidence that the North was getting tired of the war with its high cost and heavy casualties. Despite recent victories such as Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, there was little evidence that the South was weakening in its determination to make

¹ Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, eds., *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (N.Y.: Thomas Yoseloff, 1956), III, 492-554, 586-598; Allan Nevins, *The War For The Union: The Organized War to Victory 1864-1865* (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), Vol. VIII, chapter 1.

² Andrew N. Lytle, *Bedford Forrest and His Critter Company* (N.Y.: McDowell, Obolensky, 1931), 271.

good its bid for independence. It had lost territory, but its two principal armies, the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of Tennessee, were still powerful fighting forces.³

What the South needed was a breathing spell — time to consolidate its forces and prepare them better for the onslaught of the Federals. The correct policy for achieving this, as Andrew Lytle has pointed out, was a Fabian policy — a fact that was recognized by both Lee and Johnston. They wanted to prolong the war and wear out the patience of the Northern people. For this policy to succeed they needed the support of President Davis. However, the Fabian policy was not officially adopted because of Davis and his military adviser, Braxton Bragg. They were impatient for action as the events outside Atlanta demonstrated when Johnston was removed from command of the Army of Tennessee. Sherman stated that the Davis administration rendered him a great service in dismissing General Johnston who was following a Fabian policy and appointing General John Bell Hood who would come out in the open and fight an army that was superior in numbers.⁴

By early 1864 many of the Northern divisions had been furloughed and their absence weakened the Union forces in West Tennessee.⁵ It was about this time that Major-General Nathan Bedford Forrest was given command of all the cavalry in North Mississippi and West Tennessee. After defeating a Federal cavalry force of 7000 men under General William Sooy Smith out of Memphis in February, northern Mississippi was again secure.⁶ Forrest realized that his men and horses needed to recuperate, and so a part of his command, the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, went into camp in the bountiful area around Mayhew, west of Columbus. Other parts of the command went into camp at other locations.⁷

For Forrest the military situation was considerably improved. He had General Hurlbut at Memphis off balance, along with other Federal commanders. In early March, 1864, Forrest began preparing for a West Tennessee-Kentucky campaign. He had recently reorganized his command, with James R. Chalmers in charge of one

³ *Ibid.*, 271.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 271-72, 306-09, chapter 20.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁶ John Milton Hubbard, *Notes of A Private* (Bolivar, Tennessee: R. P. Shackelford, 1973), 90-94.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 94.

division and Abraham Buford in charge of the other division. Included in Chalmers' division was R. V. Richardson's brigade of Tennessee troops, the 7th Tennessee Cavalry, and Robert (Black Bob) McCulloch's brigade of Tennesseans, Texans, Mississippians, and Missourians. Buford's division consisted of A. P. Thompson's brigade, which included three Kentucky regiments, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth, Tyree H. Bell's brigade of Tennesseans, the Alabama regiment which had belonged to Jeffrey Forrest, and W. W. Faulkner's Twelfth Kentucky. Only one third of the three Kentucky regiments had mounts. Other units were in a similar predicament. One of the reasons for this expedition was Forrest's determination to obtain horses from the enemy. He also wanted to secure additional supplies, to get rid of bushwhackers and armed deserters who were preying on the people of West Tennessee, and to do a little recruiting and conscripting.⁸

On March 16, Forrest started north toward the Tennessee border with about 2,800 men, and all were in high expectation that the "wizard of the saddle" would lead them forward to more victories. He took with him Buford's division, without wagons, and five days cooked rations.⁹ Chalmers' division was left behind in several places in Mississippi with orders to gather up and arrest all men that were absent without leave or subject to conscription. They were also to collect all companies of unattached cavalry and to "do the work thoroughly and catch, if possible, the men who are going through the country and impressing and stealing horses without authority."¹⁰

After a 150 mile march Forrest arrived in Jackson, Tennessee, with the advance troopers on March 20. He found plenty of evidence of the distress of the people—the country having been laid waste from Tupelo, Mississippi to Purdy, Tennessee. There wasn't even enough subsistence for the inhabitants of this area, much less anything to support the movement of troops. "The whole of West Tennessee," he added, "is over-

⁸ *Ibid.*; Lieutenant-Colonel Robert N. Scott, ed., *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 593-594 (Hereinafter cited as the *Official Records*); *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 611; Lytle, *op. cit.*, 270-272.

⁹ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 593-594; *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 611; Lytle, *op. cit.*, 270-72.

¹⁰ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 616-617, 621, 821-822; *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 611.

run by bands and squads of robbers, horse thieves and deserters, whose depredations . . . are rapidly and effectually depleting the country."¹¹

After arriving at Jackson, Forrest found that the people were in much distress because of the operations of Colonel Fielding Hurst and his Union regiment, who Forrest described as "renegade Tennesseans." Hurst had levied a cash tribute of \$5,139.25 on the citizens of Jackson in early February 1864, under threats of burning the town. He had arrested, carried off, and confined some of the citizens. His men were also responsible for the murder of five members of Forrest's command who had fallen into their hands. Forrest made demands on the Union authorities in Memphis for a return of the money, for the release of the confined citizens at Ft. Pillow and elsewhere, and for the surrender of Hurst and his men so they could be tried and dealt with. This demand refused, as it was expected that it would be, Forrest issued a proclamation of outlawry against them.¹²

From his command post in Jackson, Forrest ordered the troops left behind in Mississippi to move closer to Memphis. This was to keep occupied the not inconsiderable Union forces at Memphis and keep them from moving after him. Forrest also made his plans for moving into western Kentucky and seizing the supplies at Paducah. A regiment was detailed to garrison Jackson. On March 22 Forrest was in Trenton where he established a recruiting station.¹³ Having heard that the Federal garrison at Union City was well supplied, he ordered Colonel W. L. Duckworth's 7th Tennessee, McDonald's battalion, and Faulkner's Kentucky regiment, about 475 men in all, to take Union City. This would be an ideal point at which to "draw" some supplies.¹⁴

In giving these orders to Duckworth and his men Forrest said, "you d-n boys have been bragging you could whip half a dozen Tennessee Yankees. You are the 7th Tennessee Rebs, the 7th Tennessee Yanks are at Union City, I am going to send you there to clean them up, if you don't, never come back here." Forrest had said enough! The men were fired up with enthusiasm, believing they could do just what Forrest had ordered. They all felt that if by some chance they were not successful

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 663-64.

¹² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 117-19, 664-65.

¹³ Rebel C. Forrester, *Glory and Tears* (Union City, Tennessee: Ha. A. Lanzer Co., Publishers, 1970), 59.

¹⁴ Robert Selph Henry, ed., *As They Saw Forrest: Some Recollections and Comments of Contemporaries* (Jackson, Tennessee: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., 1956), 153.

they would become the laughing stock of Forrest's command.¹⁵ As they moved toward Union City, Duckworth's command remembered that Colonel Isaac R. Hawkins and the men of the 7th Tennessee (Federal) were born and raised in West Tennessee as Southern men. Some of the enemy were neighbors of the Johnny Rebs and they were now going to make them prisoners of war. They realized that the Yanks would probably outnumber them by about 100 men and that they would have all the advantages of a fortified position. The Rebs began to doubt their ability saying, "boys, maybe we have been talking too strong. But Forrest has called our hands. If they fight we have a job on our shoulders."¹⁶

The closer Duckworth's command approached Union City the more numerous became the bushwhackers—men who do not fight in the open, but who laid in ambush on the side of the road. Duckworth put out a squad of flankers, and many of the bushwhackers were unable to make good their escape after having fired their shots. The command continued its movement toward Union City.¹⁷

About daybreak on March 24, Duckworth's force arrived at their objective and captured some of the enemy pickets, however, Colonel Hawkins was alerted immediately on the arrival of the Confederates.¹⁸ He was not desirous of being captured by Forrest again as he had been at Trenton in December, 1862. Hawkins had taken the precaution to notify Brigadier General Mason Brayman, the district commander at Cairo, of the approaching enemy force. Unsure of whether Union City or Paducah was Forrest's prime objective, Brayman sent Captain James H. Odlin to Union City to get an on-the-spot report, Odlin's train arrived in the early morning of the 24th, just as the Union pickets were driven in and the telegraph wires cut. He was convinced that Forrest was after Union City; he ordered Hawkins to hold out until reinforcements could arrive. Odlin then ordered his train to return to Columbus, Kentucky, which passed over a burning bridge near Union City. At Columbus Odlin sent a report to General Brayman and suggested that Hawkins should be reinforced as promptly as possible. The

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 101-02.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

general decided to utilize some 2,000 troops of the Fourth Division in Cairo for this purpose.¹⁹

Back in Union City, the pickets that were not captured were driven back to the fort near the railroad station. The fort was an enclosure with walls thrown up some ten feet high; it had logs on top and there were small portholes every few yards. The fortress was about seventy yards square. In addition, an abatis had been constructed about the fort, a defensive system where trees were cut down and their limbs and branches trimmed to a sharp point. The timbers had been placed close together, and the sharpened ends pointed outward toward any enemy force that might attack. Soon Hawkins had his command of some 500 men inside this fortress.²⁰

Duckworth's men rapidly surrounded the fort, with sharpshooters pouring a heavy fire on the Union works. About 5:30 a.m., the Federals got their first good look at the enemy as a large body of cavalry charged the fort from the south. There was heavy firing, but the attack was repulsed. The rebels dismounted and renewed the attack on foot, advancing to within twenty yards of the breastworks. This attack was launched by Faulkner's men. Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. Lannom and R. R. Hammerly, Orderly-Sergeant for Company D, were badly wounded in this action. There were two more unsuccessful charges, one being made from the northeast and the other from the northwest.²¹

William Witherspoon, a member of the 7th Tennessee Cavalry (CSA) gave a vivid account of the fighting of this day. After dismounting we "advanced on the stockade; reaching the fallen timbers we got down on all fours, crawling our way, firing occasionally as a head would pop up above the logs. It was all that we had to shoot at, they (enemy) would fire through the portholes, not of much advantage to them (as) our lying down in the timber made it difficult to see us." He went on to say that this went on for about an hour. The result was "several wounded on our side . . . The enemy's loss was five killed, some wounded all shot in the head, through curiosity or something else that prompted them to pop up their heads above the logs. Our close watch for something to shoot at, when a head did appear, a dozen or more

¹⁹ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 502-14, 540-42.

²⁰ Henry, *op. cit.*, 102-03; Forrester, *op. cit.*, 60.

²¹ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 543-45; Forrester, *op. cit.*, 60.

rifles would bang away and the owner of that head would be put out of service."²²

After the fourth unsuccessful attempt to charge the fort, the Confederates withdrew a short distance. They took shelter behind the fallen timbers and the railroad embankment. A steady fire was kept up by the sharpshooters on both sides until about 9 a.m. The Union troops were jubilant; they had taken the worst the Confederates had to offer. They now believed they could hold out until reinforcements arrived.²³ But this was not to be.

On the other side, the Confederates were not so jubilant. They had tried, and failed. Something had to be done! An idea was forthcoming, but who first suggested it is not known with certainty. Wythe tells us that it must have been Duckworth since he was the leader of the expedition. He was a physician and minister of the Gospel before the war and this would have given him the knowledge of psychology needed to formulate such an idea. Witherspoon attributed the idea to Lieutenant Livingston of Company D, 7th Tennessee; he also pointed out that others have attributed it to Adjutant Billy Pope. In any case the idea proposed was to play the old Forrest game of demanding "a prompt and unconditional surrender or accept the dire consequences, if necessary to take them by storm." This was the customary blood-curdling style of Forrest. The demand was to be signed in his name. It was hoped that this ruse, coupled with Hawkins' experience with Forrest in 1862, would accomplish by dilatory methods what force had failed to achieve. In addition to this, the Confederates made ready their "home-made" artillery—log cannons mounted on wagon wheels, drawn by two mules, with an old box on other wheels in imitation of a caisson. This was to impress the "home-made" Yankees. To further impress the Union defenders the Confederate buglers, horse handlers, and Negro cooks were sent to different locations in the battle line. As Witherspoon tells us, "the buglers would sound the artillery call" and the Confederate troopers lying "in the cut timber would yell lustily. Another artillery call, at a different point, more ringing cheers from the boys. Another bugler would sound in other quarters, more cheers, lustier than ever." To the Union men it seemed as if the Confederates

²² Henry, *op. cit.*, 103.

²³ *Ibid.*, 103; Forrester, *op. cit.*, 61.

were getting ready to shell the fort and that they were receiving reinforcements.²⁴ This was psychological warfare at its best!

With all in readiness a white flag was tied to a pole and hoisted. Livingston and Pope went to the stockade and demanded that Colonel Hawkins should surrender. The demand was couched as follows:

Headquarters C. S. Forces
In the Field, March 24, 1864

Commanding Officer, U. S. Forces at Union City, Tennessee
Sir: I have your garrison completely surrounded, and demand an unconditional surrender of your forces. If you comply with the demand, you are promised the treatment due to prisoners of war, according to usages in civilized warfare. If you persist in defense, you must take the consequences.
By Order of Major General N. B. Forrest.²⁵

Colonel Hawkins wanted a few minutes to consider the demand, and this was given him. He also wanted to speak with Forrest in person. By this time, Captain Thomas P. Gray tells us that "the Rebel troops were in full view, in the logs and stumps. The truce escort retired, and in twenty minutes, again came. I again halted them on the same ground as before, and remained with them during this interview."²⁶

On this occasion Colonel Duckworth came with the flag of truce. He informed Hawkins that Forrest was not in the habit of meeting with officers that were inferior in rank, but that he had sent Colonel Duckworth to discuss the surrender demand since he was Hawkins' equal in rank. The demand for immediate surrender was made once again! It was made perfectly clear that Forrest didn't care whether they surrendered or not since he wanted to turn loose all of his artillery on the fort, "blowing them to hell" and not leaving "a greasy spot." Hawkins was given a few minutes to make up his mind. At this point the Federal commander went back into the fort and held a council of war with his officers. Hawkins told the assembled officers that he was confident that Forrest had artillery. Captain John W. Beatty remarked that "if they had artillery they could whip us; if not they never could get inside our works." Of all the officers present only Major Thomas A. Smith said they should surrender. At this point the telegraph operator spoke up and said that the Confederates had artillery as he had seen

²⁴ Henry, *op. cit.*, 104-05.

²⁵ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 544-45.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

two pieces. Hawkins was of the opinion that if they did not surrender and renewed the fight that the Confederates would kill all that fell into their hands. However, some of the officers pointed out that reinforcements were approaching and that the fight should continue at least until the Confederates put their artillery into action. Hawkins replied that this would then be too late because Forrest would carry out his threat to "not leave of us a greasy spot."²⁷ The council of war now agreed to surrender but on the condition that the officers and men would be paroled, with the men being allowed to keep their private property and the officers their side arms. Otherwise the fight was to continue.²⁸

The decision was now made, but Hawkins did not follow the advice he received. Realizing that a massacre could take place because of the animosity that existed between the two Tennessee outfits, believing that Forrest was present with his entire command and had artillery, and knowing that Forrest would give his men good treatment, Hawkins concluded that he should surrender unconditionally. At 11 a.m. Hawkins met Colonel Duckworth, and the surrender took place. Hawkins ordered all the company commanders to march their men outside the fort and stack their arms. This was done promptly,²⁹ and the Rebels rushed to get between the Union soldiers and their rifles. At the same time the horse holders, buglers, and Negro cooks came rushing in. The Negroes were jubilant over this ruse and were yelling "here is your artillery, Toot! Toot! Toot! with all their thumbs stuck in their ears, working the hand like a mule's ear." William Witherspoon has pointed out that "our negroes, that followed our fortunes through the war, as cooks and servants, were truly as jubilant at success as we, their masters, and as sorrowful at reverses."³⁰

By this time the men of the 7th Tennessee (U.S.V.) realized that they had been tricked into surrendering, and further, they now realized that Hawkins had surrendered without conditions. They were crestfallen, angry, and dumbfounded! As Captain Beatty put it, "the officers and men cried like a whipped child," as they realized that they could have held their position, that in fact they had had the better of the Confederates. They also "cursed Colonel Hawkins, and said he was a

²⁷ Henry, *op. cit.*, 104; *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 543.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 543.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ Henry, *op. cit.*, 105.

traitor, and that they would never serve under him again."⁸¹ And so it was that 481 Union men with all of their supplies and equipment, including 300 horses, with accoutrements, some mules, and about 500 small arms fell into the hands of the Confederates. Also taken was approximately \$60,000.00 in cash, the Union men having just been paid for a year's service. At 12 o'clock Duckworth's command burned the Union barracks and all the supplies that could not be taken away. Along with their considerable booty, Duckworth's command began marching the prisoners via Jacksonville to Gardner's Station on the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, a distance of some 16 miles. There they made camp for the night of March 24. It was here that Lieutenants Samuel W. Hawkins and Robert W. Helmer made good their escape.⁸²

Meanwhile, since these events were unknown to General Brayman, who commanded the district that included Union City, he was hastening toward Union City to the relief of Hawkins. Brayman had with him the Twenty-fifth Wisconsin, the Thirty-fifth New Jersey, the Thirty-second Wisconsin, and the Seventeenth New York, numbering about 2,000 men. He travelled by river to Columbus, Kentucky, disembarked his troops, and then moved toward his objective by train. The general proceeded some twenty miles to within about six miles of Union City when he learned, to his surprise, that Hawkins had surrendered at 11 a.m. and that the fortifications at Union City had been destroyed. That ended his expedition; he returned the troops to Cairo, Illinois. However, Brayman was highly indignant at what had transpired. In his report of the affair Brayman stated that "when it is considered that the garrison was within substantial fortifications; that the enemy had no artillery; that they had been three times repulsed; that the loss of the garrison was insignificant, and the men anxious to fight, and that aid was at hand, it is to be regretted that a flag of truce should have produced a result which arms had failed to achieve."⁸³

From Gardner's Station, on March 25, the prisoners were marched fifteen miles toward Trenton and camped for the night. The prisoners were given an ounce of meat each and no bread, the first food they had tasted since the evening of the 23rd. At sunrise on the 26th the march was resumed, and Trenton was soon reached where the local citizens

⁸¹ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 543.

⁸² *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 503-08, 543-45, 611-12; Henry, *op. cit.*, 154.

⁸³ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 509-10.

sold the prisoners biscuits at \$5.00 per dozen and baked chickens at \$5.00 apiece. Duckworth's command remained in Trenton on the 27th, and three more officers made good their escape, Lieutenants James M. Neely, James W. Morgan, and Robert U. Bradford. While at Trenton Colonel Hawkins was offered a parole, but he refused, even saying that he would have any officer dismissed from the service that would accept a parole from the Confederates. Apparently Hawkins was guided by the new policy that Lincoln and Grant had put into force, that being the termination of the exchange of prisoners. Thus, if an officer had accepted parole it was expected that he would not take up arms until the prisoner exchange policy was modified. Hawkins was apparently a man of honor as he was unwilling to make a pledge that he would not keep. John W. Beatty tells us why the Confederates offered Hawkins a parole. They expected him to violate it, get a new command—men, horses, and arms—and then the Confederates would come after him again since he was such easy prey.⁸⁴

On March 28, Duckworth's command and the prisoners marched to Humboldt, a distance of some fifteen miles. Here Captains Pleasant K. Parsons and John W. Beatty made good their escape.⁸⁵ Soon Duckworth and his prisoners were in Jackson where Forrest had just returned from his successful raid against Paducah, Kentucky and other points in the Commonwealth where additional prisoners and large stores of supplies were captured. The next stop for the 7th Tennessee Cavalry (U.S.V.) was the Confederate prison at Andersonville, Georgia.⁸⁶

In his report to his superior officer General Brayman, who was safely back at his headquarters in Cairo, Illinois, stated that he would never again be guilty of stationing a small force in such places as Hickman, Union City, and other such points because they were of little importance. He was probably thinking that they offered such inviting targets that Forrest could not resist the temptation to move against them. In concluding his report Brayman pointed out that such places were "but dens for smugglers, contraband dealers, and convenient for supplying the guerrillas of the interior, and am satisfied that these enemies of the public peace receive benefits and an abundance of supplies through the facilities afforded by one small garrison and loose trade regulations,

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 543-44; Forrester, *op. cit.*, 65.

⁸⁵ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 544.

⁸⁶ Forrester, *op. cit.*, 66; *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 607.

much more valuable to them and disgracefully damaging to us than under their own occupation." The general proposed to hold only points that were of military importance and necessary for the safety of traffic on the Mississippi River.³⁷ Union City was without a regular Federal garrison for perhaps the remainder of the war. However, it was frequently visited by Union patrols.³⁸

Forrest's expedition into West Tennessee in March, April, and early May, 1864, was very successful. Most of the interior of West Tennessee and Western Kentucky was occupied and many prisoners were taken, including those at Union City, Paducah, and Fort Pillow. Large numbers of horses, wagons, arms, ammunition, and other equipment became the property of Forrest's command, which was again being supplied at the expense of the Union army. Furthermore, Forrest now had an army of some 5,000 troopers as opposed to the 2,800 when the campaign began. However, the expedition could possibly have been an even greater success had the advice Forrest gave President Davis been heeded. In a report to the President, dated April 15, from Jackson, Tennessee, he proposed that his cavalry should be combined with the 7,000 men of General Stephen D. Lee for a "move into Middle Tennessee and Kentucky which would create a diversion of the enemy's forces and enable us to break up his plans, and such an expedition, managed with prudence and executed with rapidity, can be safely made."³⁹

This suggestion was made three weeks before General Sherman began his campaign for Atlanta. This was the one movement which Sherman most feared—a raid of sufficient strength to destroy the railroad from Louisville through Nashville to Chattanooga which would stop the flow of supplies which Sherman had to receive. But Sherman had nothing to worry about. Davis's military adviser, General Braxton Bragg, did not endorse the idea, due to difficulties in Mississippi—the threat of a Union movement from Memphis—the Middle Tennessee movement never took place. Instead, Forrest was ordered back to Mississippi; by May 5 his command was back in northern Mississippi and Forrest reported for duty at Tupelo.⁴⁰ The West Tennessee and Ken-

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 503-04.

³⁸ Forrester, *op. cit.*, 66.

³⁹ *Official Records*, Vol. XXXII, Part I, Series I, 611-12.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXII, Part III, Series I, 490, 521, 527, 536, 809, 819, 821-22; *Ibid.*, Vol. XXXIV, Part III, Series I, 275.

tucky campaign was over, and Forrest's reputation was enhanced. More than ever before Forrest's "name in the West, like Stonewall Jackson's in the East, was . . . synonymous with victory."⁴¹

⁴¹ Lytle, *op. cit.*, 138.