


THE CONFEDERATE WESTERN DEFENSE LINE CRUMBLES: The Story Of Island Number Ten

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After General Albert Sidney Johnston was appointed commander of Confederate forces in the West on September 10, 1861, he completed the establishment of a defensive line that stretched all the way across southern Kentucky from Cumberland Gap in the East through Bowling Green to Columbus on the Mississippi River. Even though this four-hundred-mile battleline looked good on paper, it was fundamentally weak because Johnston had too few troops with which to defend it against the hordes in blue. He was faced with at least two-to-one odds.¹ And soon, in early 1862, this sparsely defended line began to crumble. On January 19 General George H. Thomas, later to be known as the Rock of Chickamauga, was able to defeat the forces of Generals George B. Crittenden and Felix K. Zollicoffer at Logan's Cross Roads, and thus the eastern anchor of the line was broken.²

In early February 1862, General Ulysses S. Grant and Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote, with the approval of "old brains," General Henry W. Halleck, embarked upon the not too formidable task of taking Fort Henry. Foote's transports disembarked Grant's troops close to the fort and an envelopment movement of some 20,000 troops began against a fort that was defended by approximately 2,700 Confederates commanded by Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman.³ Even before Grant was in position to attack, Tilghman, recognizing the hopelessness of his position, ordered the 2,610 man garrison evacuated to Fort Donelson. Foote's gunboats easily reduced the fort, and its few defenders surrendered.⁴ The movement against Fort Donelson was begun immediately.⁵

Foote's gunboats went back down the Tennessee River into the Ohio, entered the Cumberland River, and ascended to the vicinity of the river batteries at Fort Donelson. They also brought troops to reinforce Grant, who in the meantime had marched overland to the very outskirts of Dover and Fort Donelson. Foote attacked, but this time the outcome was different. Where Fort Henry had been located on level land with part of the fort and guns inundated with water, Fort Donelson was much better situated. The river batteries were located in an elevated position. Thus, when the naval attack took place, it was not easy for Foote's artillery to strike the Confederate defenders. In short, Foote's effort was not successful. However, he did perform a useful service in bringing reinforcements to Grant.⁶ Soon Grant was in siege positions, but the Confederate defenders fought bravely. They temporarily opened an escape route to Nashville. Escape was not possible, but due to the differences of opinion between the top ranking generals—mainly Gideon J. Pillow, Simon Bolivar Buckner, and John B. Floyd—a splendid opportunity to extricate the troops was lost. Soon Floyd and Pillow relinquished their commands to Brigadier General Buckner, and it became his responsibility to surrender the fort and approximately 10,000 to 12,000 troops and their equipment.⁷

With the defeat of Crittenden and Zollicoffer and especially the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, the Confederate line of defense was breached. Columbus, the Gibraltar of the West, was now outflanked. Thus, General Johnston had little recourse but to fall back and regroup his forces for another stand that would take place in Bloody April, the fateful Battle of Shiloh. The way was now open for a general advance up the Tennessee River to northern Alabama. Nashville was soon occupied as the Confederates retreated.⁸

Johnston and General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, his second in command, realizing that Columbus had been outmaneuvered and flanked, now made the decision to evacuate that fortress and make a stand farther south. The Mississippi River had to be defended in order to protect the "all important" Mississippi Valley.⁹ It was decided to make a stand at New Madrid, Madrid Bend, and Island Number Ten, a location some fifty-five miles from Cairo and some forty miles from Columbus.¹⁰ This position was located in the extreme northwest part of Tennessee and the extreme southeast part of Missouri. Island Number Ten no longer exists, but it was a very important piece of real estate in 1862. If it could have been defended and held, the Mississippi Valley would have been saved for the Confederacy—or at least most of it.

At this location, the river, by an extraordinary twist, resembled an S reversed. It covered twelve miles by its twists and turns, but if measured from north to south only four miles or so were involved. The island was about two miles long but rather narrow, perhaps four to five hundred yards in width. It lay at the bottom of the loop to the right. The island, coupled with the batteries on the Tennessee shore, occupied an admirable defensive position in some respects. The Confederates had the river before them, and behind them to the east was a large impassable swamp.¹¹ This made attack by land impossible so long as the defenders could remain in control of the river. As good as this position was, it was still very isolated. The Confederates could only receive supplies by the river from the south and from Tiptonville, Tennessee. If and when their communications were severed, they would be almost helpless. Retreat would be practically impossible.

As Johnston's army was withdrawing southward, General Beauregard fashioned a new line of defense that ran from New Madrid and Island Number Ten and fanned out in crescent shape through the lower part of West Tennessee south to northern Mississippi. Beauregard put Brigadier General John P. McCown in command of the defenses at Island Number Ten and New Madrid. He was soon promoted to Major General.¹² McCown was a graduate of West Point, served on the frontier, fought Indians, served with distinction in the Mexican War, and was part of the Utah expedition before resigning his commission in the United States Army.¹³

McCown pushed his defensive preparations. His chief of artillery, Brigadier General James Trudeau, with his engineers and a sizable work force, were put to work stiffening the defenses of the area, since they were expecting the arrival of Foote's seemingly invincible ironclads. The upper part of Island Number Ten was an excellent area for defensive works. But they were hampered in their labors by rising river and soggy ground. Sick-

ness was also a factor; measles, dysentery, pneumonia, and mumps were filling the hospitals and private homes. This kept hundreds of soldiers out of action.¹⁴ However, the work force made good progress felling trees, digging trenches, and throwing up gun emplacements around New Madrid, on the island, and up the Tennessee bank. In some six days twenty-six guns were mounted on the island and twenty-two more along the river bank. The *New Orleans*, a Confederate warship with nine guns, was anchored at the foot of the island in the main channel. More guns would be mounted on the island and the Tennessee shore in the weeks ahead. Headquarters for the Island Number Ten command was established on the Tennessee River bluff which overlooked the island.¹⁵

In St. Louis General Halleck had been busy following the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson. He planned on moving ground forces downriver with Foote's ironclads to take New Madrid and Island Number Ten. Next he would move against Fort Pillow and Memphis. Halleck placed Brigadier General John Pope in charge of the Army of Mississippi to operate against New Madrid and Island Number Ten.¹⁶ Pope, a graduate of West Point, saw service with the Topographical Engineers, fought in the Mexican War, and commanded the District of Central Missouri until he received his present command.¹⁷

Thus, while the island and the bank of the Tennessee were being fortified, the Confederates were in great danger of losing the Missouri shore. General Pope moved part of his army from Sikeston, Missouri, to a visible point close to New Madrid. He was there by March 2. On March 3 Pope's army rapidly drove McCown's troops back into Forts Bankhead and Thompson—two earthwork forts that were constructed to defend the river.¹⁸ The Yankees continued their drive until they came under fire by Confederate gunboats commanded by Commodore George N. Hollins, a former captain in the United States Navy who had served in the War of 1812.¹⁹ These gunboats contested hotly with Pope's artillery for possession of New Madrid and the Missouri bank. Soon Pope had some eighteen thousand men outside New Madrid, and more were still to come. Pope sent some of these troops and field artillery downriver to distract Confederate transports that were supplying Island Number Ten, forcing Hollins to withdraw his flotilla to patrol the river around Point Pleasant. Pope's artillery did a lot of damage. Finally Pope, with some heavy artillery—24-pounders and 8-inch pieces—placed at Point Pleasant, cut up Hollins' gunboats so badly that he moved farther down the river. Without the firepower from Hollins' gunboats to keep Pope at bay, McCown decided to give up New Madrid and Missouri. Late on the night of March 13 Hollins slipped some boats back upriver and began the evacuation. Most of the men were evacuated during a torrential rainstorm. The troops were angry and insubordinate; discipline almost disappeared, and many of the guns and supplies were left behind as the boats dropped downriver to Tiptonville.²⁰ Part of the New Madrid garrison was taken to Island Number Ten. The remainder of the troops moved across the river to the Tennessee side.²¹

Though Pope was unable to cross the river because of the Confederate gunboats and river batteries, he did plant batteries of artillery on the west bank, some fifteen miles south of New Madrid at Tiptonville. There

were also batteries at Point Pleasant, Pope thus made it much more difficult for Confederate transports to take supplies to Island Number Ten. He cut the flow dramatically.²²

Foote, a navy veteran since 1822, and his flotilla played an important role in the capture of Island Number Ten and the Confederate garrison. By better cooperation with Pope, this result could have been achieved much sooner. In any case, as Foote steamed southward Island Number Ten was his objective. As he was descending the river on March 5 in a dense fog, the Confederate gunboat *Grampus* suddenly appeared "close aboard." The *Grampus* "stopped here engines and struck her colors." However, when the captain of the *Grampus* saw how slowly Foote's gunboats were moving, and as the Federals had not fired on him to bring him to, the *Grampus* suddenly sped away before the Federals could fire a gun. As the *Grampus* sped away her alarm whistle was blowing so as to announce the approach of the enemy gunboats.²³

On March 15 Foote and a squadron of six ironclads and ten mortar boats, supported by transports carrying 2,000 troops under Colonel Napoleon B. Buford, moved down the river to attack the heavily fortified island.²⁴ On the 16th the mortar boats took position and opened fire, a fire that was so intense that it caused several Confederate regiments to change the location of their camps. On the 17th the gunboats joined in the attack on the uppermost fort on the Tennessee shore, but they kept at a safe distance of at least 2,000 yards.²⁵

Throughout the siege operations Foote was very cautious. Why? He knew that if his gunboats were disabled the current would not help him as had been the case at Fort Donelson. The craft would drift with the current right under the enemy guns and be either destroyed or captured. He also had to take into account that fact that there was a Confederate fleet stationed below Island Number Ten, a fleet that reliable sources said was nearly as large as his own. Thus, if several of his ships were lost, the balance of naval power would shift and the rest might be captured. The way would then be opened for the Confederates to attack Cairo, Illinois; in fact, St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, and the entire northwest would be open to invasion.²⁶

In the days that followed, from March 17 to April 4, the Federal bombardment annoyed the island's defenders but did little damage. The gunboats fired many rounds at long range, but little damage was done. The most effective work was done by the mortar boats which fired their thirteen inch bombs. These strange looking boats were sixty feet long and twenty-five feet wide. Each boat mounted one 13-inch mortar that was bolted to the deck. The recoil of these guns was terrific. When each gun was loaded for firing the crew would slip through a door that was cut in one end of the surrounding seven-foot armored bulwark. They then "stood on tiptoe on the outer deck, hands over ears, mouths agape, knees flexed against the concussion, until it was fired."²⁷ The mortar boats were effective enough that at times the Confederate defenders were forced to flee their batteries and take refuge in caves or other places of safety. However, it soon became quite evident that the Confederate works on Island Number Ten and the

Tennessee shore could not be reduced and the Confederate forces captured by Foote's flotilla alone.²⁸ There were simply too many guns on the island and the shore defenses, and little damage was being done to them.²⁹

Pope was frustrated. He had New Madrid in his possession, but unless he could get Foote's gunboats down the river past the island he would not be able to block the Confederate supply line completely. Furthermore, he would not be able to bring troops from the Missouri side to the Tennessee side and attack the rear of the Confederate fortifications just opposite Island Number Ten without great danger of disaster to his own forces. Furthermore, he needed the gunboats to silence the Confederate batteries on the Tennessee shore where he planned on crossing. In short, Pope might not be able to take the island. Something had to be done because Foote would not try to run past the big guns on Island Number Ten, Pope's pleading notwithstanding. To Foote such an effort would be suicidal for his men and result in the destruction of any gunboat that tried to run past the batteries.³⁰

If the gunboats could not run past Island Number Ten, perhaps they could go around the island. Brigadier General Schuyler Hamilton of Pope's staff thought so. To Pope he suggested the construction of a canal across the peninsula opposite Island Number Ten to just east of New Madrid. Pope assigned Colonel J.W. Bissell, an engineering officer, and six hundred men of the Engineer Regiment to the task of constructing a canal. In a few days Bissell's men plus barges, steamboats, yawls, rafts, axes, saws, and chains were working on the submerged wagon road and were felling trees to a depth of four feet below the waterline. The canal was completed by April 1. It was fifty feet wide, four feet deep, and six miles long, just big enough for transports and barges to navigate. To Pope's disappointment the canal was not deep enough to accommodate gunboats. On April 4 Pope brought more transports and troops to New Madrid through the canal. He planned on crossing the river and attacking without Foote's assistance.³¹

In the meantime a change of command had taken place on the Confederate side of the river. On March 26 Brigadier General William W. Mackall was ordered to proceed to Island Number Ten and relieve McCown. He arrived and assumed command on March 31. Mackall, a graduate of West Point, had fought in the Seminole War, the Mexican War, and one the frontier. Before leaving for Corinth, Mississippi, McCown told Mackall that Pope's efforts to cut a canal would fail, and that the Confederate positions were "safe until the river fell and no longer." McCown probably believed that an enemy attack was unlikely from either the east or above the first bend in the river.³² Mackall found the troops of his command "were broken down by hard labor, dispirited by two recent evacuations (Columbus and New Madrid), and impressed with the idea that the post was untendable and its defenses hopeless." As of April 3 Mackall's troops strength stood at 2,273 infantry, rank and file.³³ The Confederate situation was much worse than the situation Pope found himself in even though Pope was not fully aware of Mackall's desperate condition.

The situation was desperate. Pope was going to take action without Foote's assistance, using transports and barges to take his infantry across the river at Watson's Landing.³⁴ However, what Pope really needed were gunboats. They would be more effective than Pope's floating battery in pro-

tecting the men as they landed on the opposite shore. Pope put pressure on Foote to do something. Finally the slow-moving methodical Foote did move. He held a council of war on March 20 and considered the question of running the island's defenses with part of his squadron. All of the officers with one exception were opposed to the idea. Commander Henry Walke of the *Carondelet* was the lone exception. He realized that the gunboats were needed below New Madrid for joint operations with the army. So on March 30, after Foote had held another council with the same result as March 20, and with Walke's willing consent, Foote ordered him to prepare for the most perilous undertaking. Foote hoped for success but he stated to Walke: "Should you meet with disaster you will, as a last resort...set fire to your gunboat or sink her and prevent her from falling into the hands of the rebels." The Flag Officer wanted to take no chances of the *Carondelet* falling into Confederate hands. Such an occurrence would probably shift the balance of navel power in favor of Commodore Hollins.³⁵

While the naval preparations were underway for running the batteries the army was not idle. In order to help clear the way for Walke and the *Carondelet* an expedition of some fifty men of the Forty-second Illinois Regiment under Colonel George W. Roberts, on the night of April 1, moved down the river in five boats toward a battery that was known as "Number One Fort" or the upper Confederate battery on the Tennessee shore. They were able to disembark, run the Confederate defenders away, and spike all six guns in the battery. They then escaped without losing a man.³⁶ Two days later the *Benton*, *Cincinnati*, *Pittsburg*, and three mortar boats began a bombardment against the Confederate floating battery at Island Number Ten that lasted for more than one hour. The battery was struck, cut loose from its moorings and drifted two or three miles down the river before being secured. The way was being prepared for Walke's daring run.³⁷

Walke carefully prepared his gunboat for the dash past Island Number Ten. He placed loose iron and heavy timbers around the boilers and engine room. Bales of hay, chain cables and lumber were placed on the sides of his ship for extra protection. On the *Carondelet's* port quarter Walke lashed a coal barge as added protection to the magazine and shell rooms. The upper deck was covered with cordwood, coal bags, hawsers, chain-cables, and lumber. To protect the pilot house he coiled cables and ropes from twelve to eighteen inches thick. On April 4 Walke advised Foote that he was ready to run the island's defenses.³⁸

As the sun set on that fateful evening the sky became hazy. At ten o'clock when the *Carondelet* got under way a thunderstorm was about to begin. Conditions could not have been better for Walke. Perhaps he could pass unnoticed by the batteries. This was not to be. The *Carondelet* was discovered, but evidently the darkness of the night and the fact that the Confederates either could not depress their guns enough, or overestimated the distance, enabled the Union vessel to run past Island Number Ten without serious damage. Walke arrived safely at New Madrid around midnight, April 5.³⁹ The passage of the *Carondelet* was an act of great courage, especially since so many believed it would lead to destruction. This act proved to be the death blow to the Confederate river defensive positions.⁴⁰

Pope immediately demanded that Foote send another gunboat saying, "I am thus urgent, sir, because the lives of thousands of men and the success of our operations hang upon your decision. With the two boats all is safe; with one, it is uncertain." In order to make his case stronger Pope stated that even the enemy's inferior gunboats "pass and re-pass our batteries in the night without injury."⁴¹ Pope urgently wanted another gunboat.

Foote was resentful of this message since Pope was intimating that the success of the army movement depended upon his acquiescing in the request.⁴² However, despite his fears, Foote sent the *Pittsburg*, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Egbert Thompson, past the island's batteries to New Madrid on the night of April 6-7, the *Pittsburg* being discovered and subjected to the fire of seventy-three cannons. However, the gunboat arrived at New Madrid untouched.⁴³ Pope now had his two gunboats as well as troop transports, and made his plans. It was Pope's opinion that if he took his infantry to the Tennessee side not far from Point Pleasant he could take the Confederate batteries along the Tennessee from the rear. Island Number Ten would then be cut off and surrender would be inevitable.⁴⁴

By April 7 Pope was ready to act. In fact on the previous day Pope asked Walke to utilize his ship and the *Pittsburg* to silence the upper Confederate batteries on the morning of the 7th at the point where he proposed to land his troops. The two gunboats were then to hold on near the shore until the troops had disembarked.⁴⁵ Also in a dispatch to Foote on April 7, Pope informed him that he would cross the river that day and would be prepared to assault the enemy's works opposite Island Number Ten by 2 p.m. the next day. He implored the Flag Officer to keep a sharp eye out for his men and not fire into them as they assaulted the Confederate batteries from the rear. Now with the two gunboats, Pope stated, he would be able to cross the Mississippi River with the necessary force and "without increasing the tremendous hazard which must otherwise have attended such an operation."⁴⁶ The batteries were knocked out by the gunboats, with the *Carondelet* being slightly damaged in the action.⁴⁷ Now the fourth division, commanded by Brigadier General A.E. Paine, began crossing the river near Watson's Landing. The Confederates had withdrawn, leaving behind three pieces of light artillery and eleven large cannon. Pope learned from a spy that the Confederates were already retreating toward Tiptonville.⁴⁸ Why?

The Confederate command saw the handwriting on the wall. On April 4, a note signed "One of Jeff. Thompson's men," dated April 1, reached General Mackall. It told the general that Pope's canal would be completed on April 2. Mackall already knew that one of Foote's gunboats had run past Island Number Ten and had engaged and knocked out some of the lower batteries on the 6th. Mackall concluded that Pope would cross the river the next day. Thus, he began to make preparations to meet the Federals when they landed. He left the artillery men to man the forts on and near the island and one regiment of infantry to guard Island Number Ten. The rest, Stewart's light battery and the infantry in that part of the bend, some 1,000 men, moved to a central point on the peninsula. Mackall ordered the rest of the infantry, some 1,500 men, to join him at this point. He planned to at-

tack the enemy if a good opportunity presented itself. Before all his men had assembled from the various posts in the bend, the enemy was already landing under the protection of the heavy batteries of their two gunboats. An attack would be useless. Mackall now determined to save, if possible, his infantry and light artillery by retreating through Tiptonville, the only avenue of escape.⁴⁹

General Paine was now ordered not to wait for the other divisions but to push forward to Tiptonville as rapidly as possible in order to cut off the retreating Confederates. Other units would be sent to follow Paine as rapidly as possible. Pope sent Walke and Thompson with the *Carondelet* and the *Pittsburg* to the landing near Tiptonville to prevent an escape by water.⁵⁰ Mackall evidently was trying to get most of his command to Reelfoot Lake where they could cross in safety. However, Paine was able to get some of his division in front of the retreating Confederate column and their further retreat was impossible. They had to give battle or surrender. In the early morning hours of April 8 General Mackall "surrendered unconditionally his entire force to General Paine."⁵¹

As Mackall was retreating, the remnant of the defense force on Island Number Ten and the opposite shore of the Mississippi, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W.D.S. Cook of the Twelfth Arkansas and Captain A. Jackson of the Tennessee Artillery, had ordered the evacuation of their posts and left with their men to escape via Stone's Ferry across Reelfoot Lake and on foot through the swamps beyond.⁵² This was done after Cook learned that Pope had made a successful landing, had captured the Confederate artillery on the Tennessee shore, and driven Mackall back toward Tiptonville. Some of Pope's men were moving in on the lower point of the bend in the Mississippi and would soon be at Island Number Ten, thus taking the defenders from the rear. There was no way to defend the island and the Tennessee shore. The evacuation began at about 6:30 p.m. on the evening of April 7. The next morning Cook, his command, and other units arrived at the ferry across Reelfoot Lake. With the aid of three ferry-flats and a number of skiffs and canoes, the command crossed the lake on April 8-9 and was safe from the pursuing Federals. About three hundred men from the Twelfth Arkansas, one hundred fifty from the First Arkansas, and some soliders from the Eleventh Arkansas thus escaped and by April 13 were in Memphis, Tennessee. Also a few men from the commands of Colonels Brown, Baker, Clark, and Henderson made good their escape with Cook, but Cook now reported that he had lost sight of them. Many others who escaped from the river defensive position kept showing up in Memphis during the following days.⁵³

In any case, Pope had won a great victory. In his report of April 8 to Halleck, Pope stated: "Everything is ours. Few, if any, of the enemy escaped. Three generals, 6,000 prisoners, an immense quantity of ammunition and supplies, 100 pieces of siege and several batteries of field artillery, great numbers of small-arms, tents, wagons, horses, etc., have fallen into our hands." In congratulating Pope and his command for their splendid achievement, Halleck stated, "It will be memorable in military history."⁵⁴

In a later report dated May 2, 1862, Pope set the number of prisoners at 6,976.⁵⁵ It is quite possible that Pope exaggerated as to the number of prisoners. Gilbert W. Cummings of the Fifty-first Illinois brigade, who was given charge of the prisoners, estimated that they were about 3,000 in number, including Generals Mackall and Gantt.⁵⁶ Lieutenant Colonel E.D. Blake, Acting Inspector General, inspected Island Number Ten and the defensive works on the Tennessee shore a few days before the Confederate debacle. He reports that there were 2,000 effective troops available for duty, with 1,557 being on the sick report.⁵⁷ Also Cook, who escaped capture, reported that some 2,000 Confederates were probably taken prisoner.⁵⁸ And General Mackall places the number of men he had with him for opposing Pope's landing at about 2,500.⁵⁹ The truth concerning how many men were captured probably lies somewhere between Cook and Pope's figures. The weight of evidence from the various reports in the *Official Records* suggest that Cook may be closer to the truth.

In any case, the capture of New Madrid, Island Number Ten, and most of Mackall's command was a great victory. Undoubtedly, Pope would have been able to cross the Mississippi River and accomplish his mission even if Flag Officer Foote had not sent the two gunboats to his aid. However, it is also undoubtedly true that the price of an unprotected crossing would have been very high. The capture of several thousand men plus the great number of artillery pieces and other supplies was a great blow to the Confederates in the West.⁶⁰ This victory soon won Pope a new command in Virginia where he suffered a humiliating defeat by General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia in the Second Battle of Bull Run. But for now another link in the Confederate line of defense in the West was broken. This, coupled with the Union victory at Shiloh on April 6-7, virtually assured Union occupation of West Tennessee. Now all that stood between them and Memphis was Fort Pillow. It soon fell, and so did Memphis in early June. The Mississippi River—the heartland of the Confederacy—was now a little closer to being in Union hands.

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43. **Official Records**, Series I, 8:666-669.
44. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:656, 669, 88-89.
45. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:123, 669; **Battles and Leaders**, I:445; **Official Records, Navies**, 22:726.
46. **Official Record**, Series I, 8:669.
47. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:123, 669; **Battles and Leaders**, I:445; **Official Records, Navies**, 22:726.
48. **Official Records**, Series I, 8:123, 670-671, 669.
49. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:133.
50. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:670-671, 669.
51. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:674-675, 677.
52. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:157-159, 175-178.
53. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:159.
54. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:675.
55. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:89-90.
56. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:112.
57. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:136.
58. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:175-178.
59. *Ibid.*, Series I, 8:133.
60. Horn, **The Army of Tennessee**, p. 145.

TVA CELEBRATES ITS FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY

L. Darryl Armstrong

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's message to the Congress on April 10, 1933, called for the creation of an agency "charged with the broadest duty of planning for the proper use, conservation, and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory for the general social and economic welfare of the nation."

Roosevelt said that development of the Tennessee River, "if envisioned in its entirety, transcends mere power development; it enters the wide fields of flood control, soil erosion, reforestation, elimination from agricultural use of marginal farm lands, and distribution and diversification of industry."

The fifty-year history focuses on one clear conclusion: the original purpose of the Tennessee Valley Authority was economic development in the broadest sense.

It was to involve electric power, fertilizer development, river transportation, and more, welded and unified into a whole and directed toward improving the quality of life for the people in the seven-state Tennessee Valley.

In observance of the Fiftieth Anniversary of TVA, the "Valley Adventure" barges, viewed by more than one million people at the 1982 World's Fair, will tour the Tennessee Valley this spring, summer, and fall.

The barges began their river trip in April in Knoxville, and will travel the Tennessee, Cumberland and Mississippi Rivers, a journey of 1300 miles, encompassing twenty-three community stops.

From Civil War battle re-enactments to energy fairs, from street dances and old-time socials to parades and special community days of observance, the host communities throughout the Tennessee Valley are extending their hands and hearts in friendship to make the Fiftieth Anniversary of TVA a very special activity.

The "Valley Adventure" is a lively and colorful exhibit on two river barges. When you step aboard you can stroll through the past fifty years of TVA's efforts to improve the quality of life in the Tennessee Valley.

In the Kentucky District, visitors can view these exhibits at Grand Rivers, August 24-28; at Paducah, September 22-26; and at Hickman, September 30 through October 4.

From the radio address of Franklin Roosevelt, bringing hope to a dependent nation during the Depression, to the challenges of playing modern day computer games which force the making of quick decisions on power demands, the exhibits are informative and educational.

But, perhaps, even more important is the attitude expressed by the host communities. The extra efforts being displayed by these communities